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Executive Summary
The entrepreneurship literature has long recognized that entrepreneurs have different goals when starting a business, many of which are nonmonetary such as the desire to be one's own boss. The literature has been less definitive with regard to the behavioral significance of these goals. The research reported here focuses on the influence entrepreneurial goals have on new firm resource allocation. Once businesses are launched, entrepreneurs must decide on the appropriate input mix --for example, how much labor should be provided by themselves or family members and how much by hired employees. If goals are behaviorally important, they should affect the outcomes of these decisions. While it would seem likely that entrepreneurs with nonmonetary goals operate their firms differently than do those with monetary goals, scant evidence exists to support this assertion.
Drawing on previous work in management, psychology, and economics, we construct a conceptual framework in which the input decisions of utility-maximizing entrepreneurs are partly determined by their goals. We then specify an econometric model based on this framework consisting of equations showing firm inputs as functions of the entrepreneur's goals and a set of standard economic control variables (industry, region, and human capital measures).
The model is estimated using a unique dataset obtained from survey responses given by almost 3000 new business owners across regions and industries in the U.S. The most important attribute of the survey is that new owners choose among five primary goals for starting businesses that include both monetary and nonmonetary options and that align closely with core motivations found in other empirical studies. In addition, the survey includes measures of the most important new business inputs: owner hours worked per week, family hours worked per week, number of employees, and initial capital investment.
We test two hypotheses: 1) entrepreneur goals affect new firm input allocation;
2) goal effects on inputs are quantitatively meaningful.
Our results show that entrepreneurs with nonmonetary goals make significantly different decisions regarding input allocations than do entrepreneurs with monetary goals in the early months of firm operation. Owners whose primary goal is nonmonetary use relatively more of their own and family labor and relatively less employee labor compared to owners whose primary goal is monetary. In addition, differences in input usage between monetary-goal and nonmonetary-goal entrepreneurs are reasonable in magnitude, particularly with regard to owner and family hours worked. For example, owners that launched their firms to "build a successful organization" worked on average about two weeks more per year than otherwise comparable owners whose primary goal was to "make more money."
In summary, the principal contribution of the paper is to demonstrate an empirically important link between entrepreneur goals and how new firms employ inputs. Because new firm outcomes are ultimately determined by entrepreneurial resource allocation decisions, our results have implications for both researchers and policy-makers. For the entrepreneurship research community, the findings suggest greater use of goal variables in theoretical and empirical models. Among other things, their inclusion will provide an alternative explanation for frequently-observed "non-entrepreneurial" behavior such as owners who refuse to close their businesses despite poor financial performance or owners who do not seek out opportunities for expansion. For policy-makers, they suggest paying more attention to entrepreneurs' nonmonetary goals in the evaluation of alternative small business tax policies, in the design of entrepreneur promotion programs, and in the assessment of entrepreneurial "success."
Introduction
Firms do not start themselves. Someone --the entrepreneur --must make a conscious decision to commit the substantial time and resources needed to plan for and launch a new venture. 1 Because of the difficulty of accomplishing this task --the risks that must be borne and the "impertinent obstructions" (Smith, 1776 ) that must be overcome --individuals who undertake it must have strong motivations for doing so. Furthermore, given human diversity, such motivations are likely to differ from one entrepreneur to another.
The economists who created the first systematic theories of entrepreneurship recognized that people become entrepreneurs for a variety of reasons, only one of which is making money.
Joseph Schumpeter (1912) , for example, notes that individuals may launch new ventures out of the "joy of creating" or to establish a "private kingdom. " Frank Knight (1921) observes that the "prestige of entrepreneurship" and "satisfaction of being one's own boss" must be taken into account in explaining entrepreneurial decision-making. Tibor Scitovsky (1943) develops a model in which the effect of rising income on an owner-manager's work effort depends on whether his primary goal is achieving "success" or a balanced life.
Considerable modern research on entrepreneurship builds on these fundamental insights.
In the psychology and management literature, much theoretical and empirical work is based on the idea that there are a small number of core motivations for new venture creation that lie behind the much larger number of articulated reasons given by entrepreneurs. The terms used to describe these core concepts include "goals," "reasons," "purposes," "needs," "intentions," and "motivations." We use the term "goals" most frequently because it is the one used in the survey question asking our sample entrepreneurs to identify their primary reason for starting a business.
The empirical studies in these fields find that core motivations almost always include both monetary and nonmonetary goals, but they do not conclusively demonstrate that entrepreneurs with different goals behave differently. In the economics literature, entrepreneurs are modeled as utility-rather than profit-maximizers, but little theoretical or empirical attention is paid to the possibility that goal differences might affect utility functions and thus entrepreneur decisionmaking.
Looking at both bodies of work together, it is clear that the relevance (or irrelevance) of goals to entrepreneur behavior has not been established. The primary purpose of the present study is to help close this gap in the literature. Specifically, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs with different goals will operate their businesses differently, other things equal --or equivalently, that they will allocate their resources (e.g., labor and capital) differently. To investigate this relationship, we construct a conceptual framework based on economic theory that describes new venture resource allocation when entrepreneurs have different goals and then use this to specify an econometric model for testing hypotheses about the goal-input linkage. For the empirical work, we use a National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) dataset containing survey information on almost 3000 new firms from all U.S. regions and major industry groups, including information on founder goals. The paper thus represents bridge research in entrepreneurship linking traditional concerns in psychology and management with those in economics. In this regard it is a continuation of recent work aimed at bringing the mainstreams of economics and entrepreneurial studies closer together (Douglas and Shepherd, 1999; Levesque et al., 2002; Parker, 2004; Minniti and Levesque, 2008; DeTienne et al., 2008; Campbell, 2009 ).
The principal contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that the goals motivating individuals to become entrepreneurs have an important effect on how they run their new businesses. More specifically, our results show that goals exert both a statistically and substantively significant influence on the quantities of the inputs used by new firms across regions and industries in the U.S. economy. To the best of our knowledge, there is no published research that presents comparable findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3 summarizes the relevant literature; Section 4 develops a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis and presents two hypotheses; Section 5 describes the data; Section 6 specifies the econometric model and discusses estimation methodology; Section 7 presents the empirical results; Section 8 summarizes the key findings, discusses their implications for research and policy, and suggests future avenues for research.
Previous Research
Comprehensive surveys of the entrepreneurial goals literature have been provided by other scholars (Carter et al., 2003; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2006) . We give an overview to indicate the literature's breadth and importance, and then use it to position our work relative to that of other researchers.
Core Motivations
Entrepreneurs as a group typically give many reasons for why they intend to start, or actually do start, new businesses. As a result, much attention has been paid in the goals literature to identifying simpler underlying motivational structures that can then "explain" (and thus be a substitute for) the wide variety of articulated reasons (Scheinberg and MacMillan, 1988; Birley and Westhead, 1994; Morton and Podolny, 2002) . Empirical studies often begin by distilling core motivations from a larger group of reasons obtained from questionnaires, typically using factor analysis. Researchers do not always find the same core motivations, but someparticularly those relating to achieving independence and making money -occur repeatedly.
Typically, core motivations do not represent the end product of a research project.
Instead, they are "intermediate inputs" used to accomplish some larger intellectual purpose.
Broadly speaking, three such purposes are commonly found in the literature: creating entrepreneur typologies (Dunkelberg and Cooper, 1982; Woo et al., 1991; Stewart et al., 2003) , comparing goal distributions across different populations (Scheinberg and MacMillan, 1988; Carter, 1997; Kepler and Shane, 2007; Moore, 2007) , and explaining entrepreneurial behavior and outcomes. Our paper belongs to the third of these research strands.
Explaining Entrepreneurial Behavior and Outcomes
Studies in this strand focus on the development and testing of theories linking the reasons individuals start businesses to actual (or anticipated) actions and outcomes -including becoming an entrepreneur in the first place.
2 Goals thus function as independent variables in this body of work. Research in the first two strands listed above has been concentrated in the psychology and management literature. In this third strand there is research in both these fields and in economics, though the lines of inquiry have evolved independently.
Psychology and Management Literature
A variety of papers in this literature present theories which include goals as determinants of entrepreneurial behavior -the latter encompassing not only the decision to launch a business 2 In some cases the focus is on "intentions" in addition to, or instead of, behavior (Birley and Westhead, 1994; Douglas and Shepherd, 1999) . As noted by Krueger et al. (2000) , research in psychology has demonstrated that intentions are strong predictors of planned behavior "particularly when that behavior is rare, hard to observe, or involves unpredictable time lags." but also post-launch owner-manager actions and the outcomes that flow from them. 3 Douglas and Shepherd (1999) and Levesque et al. (2002) , for example, build formal utility-maximizing models of career choice in which the decision to be an entrepreneur depends on financial considerations and the desire for independence. In a study that goes beyond the launch process, Naffziger et al. (1994) construct a dynamic theory in which personal goals -both financial and nonfinancial -repeatedly affect what they refer to as the "decision to behave entrepreneurially."
Other papers providing conceptual links between goals and entrepreneurial behavior include Kaufmann (1999) , Krueger et al. (2000) , and Shaver et al. (2001) .
A considerable body of empirical research tests hypotheses emerging from these theories but with mixed results. Some papers report significant relationships between entrepreneurial goals and behavior while others do not. In the former group, Gatewood et al. (1995) find that female nascent entrepreneurs --i.e., those in the process of creating a new firm --are most likely to establish a business if their goals (e.g., the desire to be one's own boss) are internal and stable.
Choo and Wong, in a more recent study (2006) , find that nonfinancial goals are more important than financial goals in explaining the decision of retired Singapore military officers to launch a business. Other studies with results showing some causal connection between goals and behavior include Cooper and Dunkelberg (1986) , Kolvereid (1996) , and Buttner and Moore (1997) Not all research efforts find this link, however. Birley and Westhead (1994) , in a study of new British owner-managers, find significant differences among their respondents with regard to the reasons given for starting a business. However, these differences in reasons do not explain differences in firm success as measured by business size or growth. They conclude that their work supports the view that the reasons for starting a business have "minimal influence" on its future growth, wealth creation, and job generation. Carter et al. (2003) reach a similar conclusion with regard to the effect of goals on the decision to become an entrepreneur. Using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED I and PSED II; Reynolds and Curtin, 2008) , they find only small differences between the goal distributions of nascent entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs. They conclude that researchers analyzing the decision to enter the startup phase of a new venture should focus on other behavioral and cognitive variables.
The current study builds on these prior studies in two ways. First, it accepts their fundamental premises concerning the core goals that motivate people to start businessesnamely, that they are few in number and that they include both monetary and nonmonetary elements. Second, it recognizes that theoretical support for the proposition that goals affect entrepreneurial decision-making is relatively strong but that empirical support is mixed, with some researchers coming to negative conclusions concerning the overall value of goals as predictors of behavior. Our research is an extension of the empirical portion of this work and provides a new analysis of the goal-behavior linkage. The focus is on how goals affect a particular -and previously unstudied -dimension of entrepreneurial activity: the allocation of inputs in the early years of operation.
Economics Literature
A substantial body of theoretical research uses the standard tools of microeconomics to analyze the behavior of the owner-managed firm, nearly all of which derives from Scitovsky's 1943 article (Olsen, 1977; Hannan, 1982; Formby and Millner, 1985) . The main objective of most of this work (though not of the research presented here) is to identify the theoretical utility function and market conditions under which utility-maximizing behavior by an owner-manager yields the same short-and long-run outcomes as (economic) profit-maximizing behavior. As a result, the papers are not specifically about new owner-managers, and few explicit connections are made to the reasons for starting a business that are the central concern of the present work.
Goal differences can be an explanation for the utility function differences analyzed in the papers, but this possibility is only mentioned by a subset of the authors and usually only in a context that is outside the formal modeling process.
The empirical economics literature specifically addressing the link between goals and behavior is sparse. 4 The two papers that come closest to the research presented here are by
Morton and Podolny (2002) and Singell and Thornton (1997) . The first focuses on the motivations for owning a California winery. The authors construct a model of winery owner behavior that partitions owners into two groups based on their goals: those in business for "love"
and those in business for "money." They find that owner scores on the study's "love" and "money" variables have a statistically significant effect on pricing and quality decisions.
Singell and Thornton begin by noting that firm owners may have preferences regarding the types of labor they hire that are independent of relative productivity. They then build a model of firm input choice in which the labor input quantities appear in both the ownermanager's utility and production functions. This model is not based on the owner-manager's reasons for starting the business, but it does generate input demand relationships that depend on his "tastes" (as embodied in his utility function) for certain inputs separate from their contribution to profit. Analysis of the model leads to the prediction that owner-managers with different tastes will hire inputs in different proportions. The empirical portion of the study, using a small sample of family-operated Utah dairy farms divided into "utility-maximizers" and 4 Some indirect evidence for the significance of nonmonetary goals in the decision to be one's own boss can be found in the self-employment literature (Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Åsteboro and Thompson, 2007) .
"profit-maximizers," finds that utility-maximizing farms use more family-owned labor and capital relative to hired labor than do profit-maximizing farms.
Both the conceptual framework for the present paper and the econometric model based on this framework derive from these earlier lines of inquiry. As will be discussed in more detail in the next section, our conceptual framework is essentially the same as the one underlying the theoretical papers analyzing the behavior of the owner-manager. Our econometric model is different from the ones used by Morton and Podolny (2002) and Singell and Thornton (1997) but with significant overlap. We estimate firm level input relationships, as does Singell and
Thornton (but not Morton and Podolny), and we use reasons for starting businesses as independent variables, as does Morton and Podolny (but not Singell and Thornton). It differs from the models used in both papers in its explicit use of goals identified as important in earlier studies, in its exclusive focus on new firms, and in its application to firms in a wide variety of industries and regions.
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
The conceptual framework for our research is derived from established economic theories of input decision-making by the competitive firm. Traditional textbook microeconomic theory (e.g., Henderson and Quandt, 1980) assumes the firm maximizes profit (the difference between total revenue and cost) with respect to input quantities subject to its production function and exogenous prices. These assumptions lead to a set of firm level input demand equations, one for each input, in which the dependent variables are input quantities and the independent variables are input prices and output prices. In the general case, all prices enter into each demand relationship.
The theoretical literature on the owner-managed firm cited in the previous section modifies the textbook input demand model in three ways. First, it separates owner-provided inputs (mainly labor) from those purchased in the market. The latter are included in the firm's (accounting) cost relationships, the former are not. Second, it assumes that the results of firm decision-making -specifically, the allocated quantities of owner-provided and (in some papers) purchased inputs and the resulting accounting profit -are evaluated subjectively by the ownermanager. This means that owner-managers are modeled as utility-rather than profit-maximizers with utility functions whose arguments include both accounting profit and variables representing sources of non-market costs and benefits that may result from firm ownership and control -most commonly input quantities (or their opposite in the case of labor inputs, leisure). 5 Third, it assumes that different owners can have different "tastes" with regard to the relative importance of the elements in their utility functions. In Scitovsky's classic paper (1943) , for example, all owner-managers value leisure and accounting profit (both entering their utility functions) and face a trade-off between them, but they differ in the relative value they assign to these "goods" as indicated by the slopes of their indifference curves at different income levels. Utility maximization in the owner-managed firm model yields input demand equations that depend on the owner-manager's utility function as well as his production function and market prices.
Our conceptual framework takes the owner-managed firm model as its point of departure and adds three additional assumptions. The first is that the business is a new one so we can 5 All models in this literature assume the marginal utility of leisure is always positive, implying the marginal utility of work effort is always negative. This assumption yields conventional downward-sloping indifference curves for the owner in accounting profit-leisure space. Many entrepreneurs are "workaholics," however, who seem to prefer work to leisure. This suggests an alternative specification for the entrepreneur utility function wherein the marginal utility of work is positive (and hence the marginal utility of leisure is negative) for initial work hours but then turns negative as hours increase beyond some point. This approach yields U-shaped indifference curves. As long as accounting profit increases with work effort, however, the utility-maximizing quantity of work hours will always be in the range where the marginal utility of work is negative. For arguments for and against "effort-preferring" entrepreneurs, see Douglas and Shepherd (1999) .
legitimately refer to the owner-manager as an entrepreneur. The second is that the entrepreneur's utility function is determined by his primary goal in launching his business. The third is that the arguments in his utility function include not only his own labor hours (as in the Scitovsky model) but also the quantities of the other inputs. In this setting, utility maximization leads to firm input quantities that depend explicitly on the entrepreneur's primary goal.
More specifically we assume (following Singell and Thornton, 1997) that our firms use four primary inputs to produce output: owner labor, family labor, employee labor, and capital.
These are the entrepreneurs' decision variables. Neither owners nor family members are paid a wage for their labor input. Instead, families are compensated as a whole out of accounting profit.
Input prices for employee labor and capital and output price are exogenous. The firms' production functions vary by industry and have the quantities of the four inputs as arguments.
Our database provides measures of entrepreneur education and experience. These human capital indicators are also included as arguments in the production function to take account of their likely effect on the marginal productivity of the primary inputs. nonmonetary (e.g., building an organization). Each entrepreneur then has a utility function 6 A more formal description of the production and utility functions that underlie our conceptual framework may be found in the Appendix. 7 The exogeneity assumption means that the paper does not seek to explain goal differences among entrepreneurs or goal changes over time by any given entrepreneur. The first of these topics is addressed in the literature on goal distributions across populations cited in Section 3.1. The second is the central concern of the literature on retrospection bias cited in Section 5.3.
whose parameters depend on his primary goal and whose arguments are accounting profit and the quantities of the four inputs. The inclusion of labor and capital quantities in the utility function allows an entrepreneur to receive direct utility (or disutility) from these inputs beyond their contribution to accounting profit (Errington and Gasson, 1994; Singell and Thornton, 1997) .
Given utility functions with these features, new owners with different goals may choose different input combinations. Consider, for example, an entrepreneur whose primary (nonmonetary) goal is building an organization. Utility maximization by this individual may lead him to allocate more of his own and family labor to the enterprise (in an effort to create a larger firm) than would be allocated by an otherwise identical entrepreneur whose primary goal was monetary.
Overall, this framework specifies that new firm input quantities depend on both entrepreneur goals and standard economic variables --input prices, output prices, and production function characteristics. The main purpose of the present research is to assess the strength of the goal variable effects on input allocations controlling for all other influences. To do this, we test two hypotheses. The first focuses on the statistical significance of these effects:
Hypothesis 1: Entrepreneur goals affect new firm input allocation.
Entrepreneur goals may have a statistically significant effect on inputs, but such a finding is not particularly important unless the effect is economically meaningful. For example, if new owners with nonmonetary goals worked 0.5 hours per week more than those with monetary goals, the result, even if statistically significant, would not be substantively significant if owners overall averaged 60 hours per week. The second hypothesis thus focuses on effect sizes:
Hypothesis 2: Goal effects on inputs are quantitatively meaningful.
Data

Sample Description
The research reported here uses a dataset obtained from the first year of a three-year panel study of new business owners conducted by the NFIB from 1985 to 1987 (Cooper et al., 1990) . In May 1985, the NFIB sent initial questionnaires to the approximately 13,000
organization members who reported that they had recently become business owners. Of the 4,814 that were returned, only the 2,994 firms reporting a first sale in 1984 or the first five months of 1985 were selected for further analysis. The purpose of the first sale requirement was to exclude nascent firms from the sample (distinguishing it from the PSED samples which only include such firms). 8 In addition to having made a first sale, 75% of the 2,994 firms had the equivalent of two or more full-time employees at the time of the survey.
Data were collected on a wide variety of entrepreneur and firm characteristics. Table 1 gives an overview. Respondents were predominantly male, not members of a minority group, and between the ages of 25 and 54. Most also did not have a baccalaureate degree and had never previously owned a business. More than 75% had prior supervisory or management experience, however; and almost 50% had parents who owned a firm. Their businesses were distributed across the eight U.S. Census regions and nine industries, with a heavy concentration in the retail and service sectors. Almost 70% of the firms were newly created and over 70% had only a single owner. Nearly 90% made their first sale within three months after their first major business expenditure.
Variables
The dependent variables in our empirical model are firm input quantities and the key independent variables are the primary goals of the new owners. As noted in the previous section, inputs may also depend on more objective factors such as prices, production function characteristics, firm ownership structure, and firm mode of acquisition. We capture the influence of these using a set of control variables that differ in general from the specific economic variables identified by the textbook and owner-manager models. We therefore do not interpret our estimated relationships as input demand functions.
Dependent Variable: Inputs
The NFIB survey provides measures for the four primary resource inputs identified in the conceptual framework: owner labor (L O ), family labor (L F ), employee labor (L E ) and capital (K). hours and a median of zero hours. L E is the number of employees measured in full-time equivalents (FTEs) with part-time workers counted as 0.5 FTE. The mean and median values for this measure are 4.7 and 3.0 respectively. K, initial capital investment, was collected using the intervals shown in Table 2 rather than in specific dollar amounts. Using the midpoints of all the categories except the last where $500,000 is used, the mean value for this measure is slightly more than $51,000 and the median value is $34,000.
The first three (L O , L F , L E ) are count measures -i.e., variables that only take on nonnegative integer values. 9 The distributions of two of these, L F and L E, are highly skewed. The 9 Employees are reported in FTEs resulting in many values ending in 0.5. Because of this, the series had to be rescaled (multiplied by 2) to convert all values into integers.
fourth dependent variable, K, is categorical and ordered. These distributional characteristics affect the choice of estimation procedure.
Independent Variables: Goals
The question in the NFIB survey that we use to identify an entrepreneur's primary goal Owners rated the choices from most important to least important on a five-point scale. The distribution of first choice (i.e., primary) goals is shown in Table 3 . The most frequent first choice is BU, chosen by 29% of the respondents, followed by WK chosen by 25%. MO and AV were chosen by 17% and 18% of the respondents respectively. Only 10% chose the other category or gave no response (OT). The NFIB goals, in addition to being intuitively reasonable, align closely with core motivations for starting businesses found in many other studies (Scheinberg and MacMillan, 1988 Shane et al., 1991; Kuratko et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003; Choo and Wong, 2006; Reynolds and Curtin, 2008) . Goals enter the empirical model as dummy variables. There are four such variables (for five goals), each taking on the value one for a particular primary goal and zero otherwise.
Independent Variables: Controls
There are three groups of control variables. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4 .
The first group consists of variables that capture the industry and price effects identified in the conceptual framework. Firms in different industries have different production functions and face different input and output prices. In addition, input and output prices for firms in the same industry may vary by region. Following the procedure used by many other empirical studies of firm and entrepreneur behavior (Graves and Langowitz, 1996; Westhead et al., 2001; Townsend et al., 2010; Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Chua et al., 2011) , we control for such influences using dummy variables: eight industry variables (for nine industries, using 2-digit SIC classifications) and seven regional variables (for eight regions). 10 Because of the importance of labor in most small-scale production processes, we supplement these dummy variables with a separate measure of the price of labor: industry-region wage, the median industry wage rate by region in 1985
(computed using data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System database).
11
The second group of controls accounts for production function differences arising from differences in the human capital entrepreneurs bring to their new businesses. Inclusion of such variables is standard practice in empirical studies of entrepreneurship Cassar and Craig, 2009; Townsend et al., 2010; Ucbasaran et al., 2010) . Included in this group are measures of the owner's age, education level, number of business classes, number of previous full-time jobs, management experience, business ownership experience, and parents' business ownership experience. Each of these variables enters the empirical model in categorical form. There are three age dummy variables (for four categories); four education dummies (for five categories); three business class dummies (for four categories); five previous jobs dummies 10 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of such imperfect proxies see Wooldridge (2002) .
11 With regard to the price of capital, approximately 50% of the financing for the typical sample firm comes from personal savings or loans from "friends, family, and fools," the opportunity cost of which is unlikely to vary much by region or industry (Cooper et al., 1990; Dunkelberg and Scott, 2011) . We assume price differences for the remaining 50% are captured by the region and industry dummy variables (particularly the latter).
(for six categories); and single dummy variables (Yes = 1) for management experience, previous ownership, and parents' previous ownership.
Not all entrepreneurs are the sole owners of newly created businesses as assumed in the conceptual framework. As shown in Table 1 , the NFIB sample includes new owners who purchased the firm (28%), inherited the firm (2%), or were brought in to take it over (3%). It also includes owners with one partner (20%) and with two or more (9%). Firms deviating from the single-owner-of-new-firm prototype are likely to have different resource allocation patterns than otherwise identical non-deviating firms. For example, firms with multiple partners might have greater access to resources and therefore be larger (i.e., have more capital goods and employees) than single-owner firms. The third group of controls consists of two dummy variables included to capture such effects. The first, non-startup, captures "entrepreneurial mode" (i.e., how the new owner acquired the business); it takes on the value zero for the startup case and one for the non-startup case. The second, partners, captures the firm's ownership structure; it takes on the value zero for the no-partner case and one for the one-or-more-partners case.
Data Assessment
The NFIB survey data has four distinct strengths given the objectives of this paper. First, the sample is both large and comprehensive. Most empirical studies of entrepreneur behavior are based on datasets with a small number of cases and limited industry coverage. Studies using the PSED survey data are exceptions to this statement, but the PSED I and PSED II initial interview samples are still only 28% and 40% respectively of the NFIB sample size (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008) . Second the NFIB dataset contains detailed information on both the new owner and his firm. It provides not only the study's dependent variables (resource inputs) and key independent variables (goals) but also many other firm and owner descriptors that enter the empirical model as controls. Third, the NFIB goal variables are well aligned with the core motivations for starting businesses found in other studies. Fourth the NFIB firms are new and in operation. This means that we test for goal effects in firms that are no longer nascent (unlike those in PSED) and do so at a moment in their history --within 17 months of the first sale --when these effects are likely to be the strongest. It also means that retrospection bias --the difference between actual goals at the time of startup and goals reported later (Carter et al., 2003) --is likely to be small.
Because of these features, it is the only dataset of any vintage available for the purposes of this study.
A potential weakness of the NFIB dataset is its age. There is little doubt that the profile of new businesses (including, possibly, the nature and distribution of owner goals) has changed in the U.S. since 1985. However, such a change does not imply that the underlying relationship between goals and inputs --the focus of this study --has also changed. In our view, the goalinput linkage is a relationship ultimately rooted in human psychology and thus unlikely to vary much over time. 12 We believe, therefore, that the results presented in Section 7 are applicable to current U.S. entrepreneurs. 
Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology
12 If the underlying relationship --the so-called population regression equation (Greene, 2007 ) --has not changed, estimation with 1985 data yields results that are statistically no worse (or better) than those that would be obtained with data from later years. If it has changed, the only way to get good estimates is to use current data which, as noted above, do not exist. With regard to our formal hypothesis testing procedure, we make two further decisions.
The first is to perform hypothesis tests separately for each equation in (1) In any equation where the null hypothesis is rejected, we can conclude that at least one type of nonmonetary-goal owner hired on average a different quantity of the input than did an otherwise identical monetary-goal owner.
Two econometric issues arise given the structure of the formal model in (1) and the data used to estimate it. First, inasmuch as each owner decides jointly on input quantities, it is likely that there is contemporaneous correlation of the error terms within firms across the inputs. In general, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators in such situations are unbiased and consistent but less efficient than a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator that takes these correlations into account. The regressors in (1), however, are the same in each of the input equations. In this special case, OLS estimators are the same as the SUR estimators (Greene, 2007) . On the basis of this result we chose to estimate the equations in (1) 
Results
The principal findings of this study are given in Tables 5 and 6 . The former presents results that demonstrate the statistical significance of the goal-input linkage, supporting Hypothesis 1. The latter presents results that demonstrate the substantively significance of the linkage, supporting Hypothesis 2. Table 7 reports the outcome of a robustness test. Throughout, the analysis focuses on the relationship between goals and input choice with limited discussion of results for the control variables.
Hypothesis 1
The first four rows in Table 5 Table 6 presents marginal effects computed from the goal coefficient estimates in the first four rows of Table 5 . Because the statistical significance of the goal variables in the K equation is weak, Table 6 only presents results for the three labor equations. Overall, the magnitudes of these effects seem reasonable; they are neither trivial nor of overwhelming importance. We conclude that they provide strong support for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2
Robustness
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimated the equations in (1) using several alternative specifications and estimation techniques. In each case, the results for the goal variable coefficients and hypothesis tests were not meaningfully different from those presented in Table 5 . All, therefore, supported Hypotheses 1 and 2. In this section, we briefly examine the results of one such assessment.
The control variables in (1) include a dummy variable for entrepreneurial mode (nonstartup) and a dummy variable for ownership structure (partners); they are included to capture the direct effects that mode of acquisition or number of partners might have on input allocation.
An additional possibility is that some interaction exists between these variables and the goal variables --i.e., that the effect of any particular goal on the quantity of an input chosen might depend (say) on whether the firm was a startup or non-startup. A priori arguments can be made in support of the plausibility of such interactions. For example, in the non-startup case the input mix at the time of acquisition might limit (at least temporarily) the owner's ability to make an allocation that is more aligned with his primary goal.
An alternative specification that takes such effects into account adds eight interaction variables to each of the input equations shown in Table 5 : four goal x non-startup dummies and four goal x partners dummies. The results of estimating the input equations including these terms are presented in Table 7 . Focusing only on the goal coefficients, we see, first, that the joint
Wald test results continue to provide strong support for Hypotheses 1. Second, while the individual goal coefficients in Table 7 differ somewhat from those in Table 5 , the effect sizes computed from them (not reported here) are of the same sign and order of magnitude as those shown in Table 6 , supporting Hypotheses 2. Based on this and other experiments, we believe that our conclusions regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2 drawn from Tables 5 and 6 are robust with regard to alternative specifications or estimation methods. 
Discussion
Key Findings
Research on the behavioral significance of entrepreneur goals in general and on the goalinput linkage in particular has been limited in scope with few well-established conclusions. The primary objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature by demonstrating that entrepreneurs with different reasons for starting their businesses allocate their labor and capital differently. We derive hypotheses from a conceptual framework based on the utility-maximizing behavior of entrepreneurs with alternative goals (monetary and nonmonetary) and test them using data from a large national survey of new business owners. Our results dictate rejection of 15 Separate estimations were also run for only those owners that started a new firm and had no partners. The results for the goal variables were statistically and economically very similar to those in These results have implications both for entrepreneurship researchers and for policy-makers seeking to promote entrepreneurship in the economy.
Implications for Research and Policy
Research
New firm future outcomes (survival, profitability, growth) are ultimately the result of entrepreneurial resource allocation decisions. Given the importance of outcomes, our finding that ex ante reasons for starting a business influence ex post labor and capital allocations in a meaningful way suggests that goals need to be included more frequently in theoretical and empirical analyses of entrepreneurship. In much of the economics and economics-related theory literatures, the entry and exit of firms is modeled mechanically rather than behaviorally.
Formally including entrepreneurial motivations into models with entry and exit would greatly extend our ability to analyze these processes and at the same time provide alternative explanations for "non-entrepreneurial" behavior such as the persistence of underperforming firms (Gimeno et al., 1997; DeTienne et al., 2008 ) and the failure of many established new firms to grow or innovate (Hurst and Pugsley, 2011) .
If goals have a meaningful impact on entrepreneurial decisions as our results suggest, more empirical models should include them as well --typically as independent variables along with other entrepreneur descriptors such as gender, age, ethnicity, and education. A recent line of papers, for example, focuses on entrepreneur expectations as an intervening variable between past business experience and future business activity (Ucbasaran et al., 2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2010; Townsend et al., 2010) . Entrepreneur goals are not considered in these studies, and thus a logical extension would be to include them explicitly in the explanatory framework. Goals could be modeled as intervening between experience and expectations, as influencing future business activity in parallel with expectations, as intervening between expectations and activity, or as exerting some combination of such influences. Whatever the specific approach, we believe the inclusion of goal variables would provide a more realistic representation of how entrepreneurs make decisions.
Policy
The empirical results presented in this paper are based on the work of earlier scholars
showing that the majority of entrepreneurs start businesses for nonmonetary reasons. They demonstrate that goals are behaviorally meaningful in general and, more specifically, that entrepreneurs with nonmonetary goals use relatively more own and family labor than do those with monetary goals. These findings suggest that policy-makers seeking to promote entrepreneurship in the economy need to base their recommendations on a more nuanced view of the entrepreneurial process. We make three points in this regard.
The first concerns tax policy. The importance of small businesses in the national economy is well-document and often cited in debates about the effect of tax rate changes on entrepreneurial entry and hiring. Our results indicate that such effects are likely to be less important, at least in the short run, than is often assumed because taxes will matter most to entrepreneurs with monetary goals and these represent less than 50% of all entrepreneurs. With regard to entry, it is well-established that the majority of nascent entrepreneurs have nonmonetary primary goals (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008) and thus are unlikely to be influenced much by tax changes in deciding whether or not to take the plunge. Recent research using micro-datasets has found that tax effects on entrepreneurial entry are relatively weak (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006) . The present study demonstrates the behavioral significance of nonmonetary goals and thus provides one possible explanation for these findings. Concerning new firm hiring, our econometric results show a negative association between having a nonmonetary goal and hiring non-family employees. Since most new firm owners have nonmonetary goals (Table 3) , this finding points to the likelihood that tax changes will again have a significant effect on only a minority of firms and thus that their overall impact on new firm hiring will be limited.
Our second point is a cautionary note regarding the design of programs to promote 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Like every study, this one has limitations which suggest directions for future research.
The first is the age of the NFIB data. Although we believe our findings apply to current entrepreneur behavior, we acknowledge concerns that the nature of the goal-input linkage may have changed over time. Re-estimation of our input relationships is therefore called for once more contemporary data become available. Second, our analysis focuses only on short-run behavior. Our firms were in business for less than18 months at the time their owners filled out the NFIB questionnaire. A natural follow-up question is whether initial goals continue to affect entrepreneur decisions in businesses that survive beyond this early stage. On the one hand, the owner's initial goals may help establish an organizational culture which persists through time.
On the other, changing circumstances may make such goals irrelevant. Only empirical investigation can determine which effect is more important. Third, because our focus is on the actions of very young firms we do not investigate the effect of goal differences on entrepreneurial outcomes such as survival, profitability, and growth. Despite our reservations (noted above) about using such objective measures as the sole indicators of success, it is clear that examining the effect of goals on outcomes is a natural extension of the present research.
Fourth, our conclusions can be applied only to U.S. entrepreneurs. For many reasons, one would expect the psychology of entrepreneurship to be different in different societies, both with regard to the specific motivations for starting businesses and the effects such motivations have on behavior. There is already a literature on the first of these topics. This work should be extended to address the second.
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a more formal description of the entrepreneur production and utility functions that underlie the conceptual framework described in Section 4.
The production function for the representative entrepreneur in industry i can be represented as follows: Owner and family labor are unpaid. Because the entrepreneur is an owner-manager, it is assumed he maximizes utility rather than (accounting) profit. It is necessary, therefore, to specify a utility function for him as well as a production function. This relationship has two significant features for the purposes of the study. First, it is indexed (j = 1, 2, 3. 4, 5) according to the entrepreneur's primary goal and, second, its arguments are the input quantities and accounting profit (π):
The entrepreneur's decision variables are the four input quantities. Maximization of utility subject to the production function and exogenous prices (input and output) yields input quantities that depend (among other things) on the entrepreneur's primary goal. 
